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A Tale of Two Sandys
Abstract
Responses to Hurricane Sandy consistently cluster into two types according to how the issues have been
defined and understood. On one hand, the crisis was seen as an extreme weather event that created physical
and economic damage, and temporarily moved New York City away from its status quo. On the other hand,
Hurricane Sandy exacerbated crises which existed before the storm, including poverty, lack of affordable
housing, precarious or low employment, and unequal access to resources generally. A Tale of Two Sandys
describes these two understandings of disaster and discuss their implications for response, recovery, and
justice in New York City.
The white paper is based on 74 interviews with policymakers, environmental groups, volunteer first
responders, and residents affected by the storm; ethnographic observation; analysis of public reports from
government, community-based organizations, and other groups; qualitative analysis of canvassing forms and
data; and a review of the academic literature on disaster response. As a framing document, A Tale of Two
Sandys selects certain case studies for their exemplary nature, including how different groups identified
vulnerable populations, timelines for aid and recovery, a case study of housing and rebuilding, and finally,
urban climate change politics. The primary purpose of A Take of Two Sandys is to propose a sophisticated,
accurate, and useful way of understanding the inequalities entwined with Sandy’s aftermath and to enable
ways to address them.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Page 2
If we think of Hurricane Sandy as the extreme weather that hit the New York City region on October 29, 2012, then the storm was one of the worst in the country’s history, killing dozens of people, affecting hundreds of thousands, and inflicting as much as $75 billion in economic losses. But if we think of 
Hurricane Sandy as the multitude of crises that followed the event, then it’s clear that each locale—and 
perhaps each person—had its own unique confluence of crises, and its own “Sandy.” Homeowners on Staten 
Island trying to deal with insurance claims; residents of public housing in Coney Island trying to navigate 
highrise apartment buildings with no electricity; city officials trying to balance the budget this new fiscal 
year: each faced their own disaster.
Yet, despite this wide range of needs, obstacles, and crises, Superstorm Research Lab (SRL) has found that 
responses to Hurricane Sandy consistently cluster into two types according to how the issues have been 
defined and understood. We tell A Tale of Two Sandys to characterize these two genres: on one hand, the 
crisis was seen as a weather event that created physical and economic damage, and temporarily moved New 
York City away from its status quo; on the other hand, Hurricane Sandy exacerbated crises which existed 
before the storm and continued afterwards in heightened form, including poverty, lack of affordable housing, 
precarious or low employment, and unequal access to resources generally. Even though there was crossover 
and blurring between these two Sandys, the stakeholders that tended towards the first understanding of 
Sandy included New York City’s government, elite institutions, and large NGOs. Community-based groups, 
affected residents, many volunteer first responders, owner-operated businesses, and some NGOs tended 
towards the second.  In this white paper we describe these two Sandys and discuss their implications for 
response, recovery, and justice.
This report is based on 74 interviews with policymakers, environmental groups, volunteer first responders, 
and residents affected by the storm; ethnographic observation; analysis of public reports from government, 
community-based organizations, and other groups; qualitative analysis of canvassing forms and data; and a 
review of the academic literature on disaster response. As a framing document, A Tale of Two Sandys does 
not cover all aspects of the crisis, but selects certain case studies for their exemplary nature. Its primary 
purpose is to propose a sophisticated, accurate, and useful way of understanding the inequalities entwined 
with Sandy’s aftermath and to enable ways to address them.
The Two Sandys division reaches deep into the 
politics, economy, and everyday life of post-Sandy 
New York, from housing, to aid, to climate change.
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Summary of findings
•	 There have been two different ways of understanding and responding to the crises of Hurricane 
Sandy. One tends to see Sandy-related crises as problems following directly from storm conditions 
and to approach response efforts as means to restore the pre-storm status quo. The second sees Sandy 
as exacerbating a chronic crisis characterized by poverty, low and precarious employment, and a lack 
of access to resources such as transportation, healthcare, and education. We call this the Two Sandy 
phenomenon.
•	 While some groups portrayed elements of both Sandys, proponents for each group are mainly divided 
among elite, powerful actors, and residents, community-based groups, and owner-operated 
businesses on the ground. 
•	 Top-down, elite aid is characterized by finite programs with deadlines, while grassroots and 
community aid often takes a longer view.
•	 Equity and equality are often used interchangeably in NYC disaster recovery discourse about 
resilience, yet are opposing concepts that result in mutually exclusive forms of aid and response.
•	 The use of non-emergency population categories—everyday stakeholder categories such as 
homeowners or students—rather than indicators of vulnerability, reproduces inequity and 
vulnerability in disaster relief.
•	 Some forms of disaster response, such as rebuilding loans that increase debt burdens, produce their 
own second-order disasters and can move formerly resilient populations into more vulnerable 
positions. 
•	 Since Sandy, government discourse and action towards climate change has shifted from prevention to 
adaptation.
•	 Top-down mandates for recovery create a mode of participation where the people most affected 
can only react to those in power, rather than work in partnership to set recovery agendas that meet 
community needs.
These findings are not unique to New York City’s response to Hurricane Sandy (Solnit 2010; Knowles 2012). 
The disjunction between elite and community concepts and needs, as well as many other findings outlined 
above, have occurred in other disasters in other places at other times. As such, this white paper works to 
identify these trends and find meaningful points of intervention to amend them. 
INTRODUCTION
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Disasters always produce multiple crises. The way individuals and groups experience a disaster—and the impact the disaster 
has on their lives—varies according to geographic 
location and demographic characteristics such 
as socioeconomic status, personal history, and 
differential access to resources before, during, 
and after the event. Hurricane Sandy, which tore 
through the New York region in late October, 
2012, exemplifies this reality. The storm affected 
hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers in various 
ways, from temporary power outages to long-term 
loss of housing. Fifty-three New Yorkers died. 
Now, a year later, the majority of those affected 
have seen their lives return to normal. Yet, there is 
presently broad consensus that hundreds of New 
Yorkers still haven’t been rehoused, thousands are 
dealing with economic insecurity resulting from 
the storm, and even more suffer from enduring 
physical and mental health problems. What’s 
more, for many affected areas whose residents and 
businesses were already struggling economically 
prior to the storm, a return to the status quo hardly 
represents a victory. As illustrated by two excerpts 
from our interviews above, the fact that Sandy was 
experienced in very different ways by different 
groups was not lost on New Yorkers.
The reality of one disaster with multiple crises is 
at odds with the ideal underlying disaster relief, 
where the goal is to bring everyone out of their 
distinct crises into a shared recovery. Unfortunately, 
the ideal of a shared, universal recovery is a myth. 
Exploring Sandy’s troubled aftermath, Superstorm 
Research Lab (SRL) discovered that even though 
there were many different conceptualizations of 
and responses to the disaster, they tended to cluster 
into two genres. Over and over, elite and dominant 
groups such as New York City’s government, elite 
institutions, and large NGOs framed the disaster 
as a discrete weather event that created structural 
and economic damage, and temporarily moved 
New York City away from its status quo, while  
affected residents, volunteer first responders, 
I really felt like there’s been two New Yorks since the storm, like the one that’s been completely turned upside 
down since the storm and the one that’s going about business as usual. And I think it’s been hard for me to 
spend time in the business as usual one without just kind of wanting to shake people and be like, ‘Do you 
understand that people half an hour away from here are living in mold and you can do something about it if 
you just like put on some gloves and get out there?’
- New York City resident and volunteer first responder
I think there were two pretty separate disasters happening in Red Hook at the same time—the one being 
thousands of low-income people living without heat, or hot water, or power, and then there was also a bunch 
of businesses that were really badly damaged. And some of them were small business owners, a lot of small 
business owners who had very few resources, and then some bigger businesses, and so I think that whereas—
life is pretty much back to normal in the Red Hook houses. Some of those businesses have reopened, but I think 
there’s a bigger difference in their lives from before the storm to now, than there is in the lives of people who 
were living in the houses.
- Red Hook resident and director of a community-based organization
Page 5
community-based organizations, and owner-
operated businesses talked about ongoing social 
and economic conditions, not limited to single 
moments of destruction, that began before the 
storm and continued afterwards. These included 
pressing problems of poverty, lack of affordable 
housing, precarious or low employment, and 
unequal access to resources in general. We call this 
the Two Sandys phenomenon, and it characterizes 
the divergent definitions of crises and the plans 
meant to address them across the whole of New 
York City and surrounding area. 
To be clear, the Two Sandys phenomenon is a 
cultural frame for understanding the effects of 
Hurricane Sandy rather than a way to map con-
cepts onto individual groups. Not all members of 
elite institutions focus on restoring New York City’s 
status quo, and not every affected resident spoke 
about wealth inequity. In fact, some individuals and 
organizations contain a mix of the Two Sandys. For 
example, one high-ranking city official wanted to 
ensure that undocumented workers in the city re-
ceived special aid given their lack of access to many 
official response mechanisms, but FEMA declined 
this differential support (SRL interview). Yet, at the 
same time, FEMA worked closely with Occupy San-
dy, which co-organized many of the relief hubs, and 
tended to offer targeted support to undocumented 
workers. Thus, the Two Sandys phenomenon is an 
analytical framework which helps us to identify 
distinct patterns in the way disaster was defined, 
and these definitions tended to cluster around how 
elite, top-down organizations versus grassroots, 
bottom-up groups conceptualized the disaster and 
recovery, while noting that individuals within these 
groups may subscribe to either (and sometimes 
both) definitions as the groups intersected with 
each other in the aftermath of the storm and con-
tinue to do so today.
The Two Sandys division reaches deep into the 
politics, economy, and everyday life of post-Sandy 
New York, from housing, to aid, to climate change, 
though the schism has its origins well before the 
storm (Wallace & Wallace 1998; Cutter 2006; Yohe 
2010). This division threatens to stretch into the 
future as many Sandy survivors continue to recover, 
as inequalities of disaster vulnerability persist, 
and as climate change exacerbates the threat that 
extreme weather poses to New York City. Each 
of these problems can be diminished through a 
city-wide commitment to social, economic, and 
environmental justice. Doing so will require, first, 
taking stock of the problem.
This white paper describes the Two Sandys 
problem, both in initial experiences of the storm as 
well as subsequent recovery efforts, and uses this 
framework to analyze the main debates in recovery 
taking place in New York City. Our analysis has 
been informed by extensive research on the storm’s 
impact on New York City and surrounding area, 
including:
•	 Seventy four (74) interviews across four groups: 
policymakers and government officials, NGOs 
and CBOs and other institutions involved 
in relief and recovery efforts, professional 
and volunteer first responders, and affected 
residents;
•	 Ethnographic observation of affected residents, 
volunteer respondents, activist groups, and 
policy meetings;
•	 Analysis of policy and research reports by 
government agencies, NGOs, and CBOs (a full 
list can be found at www.superstormresearchlab.
org);
•	 Qualitative analysis of canvassing forms and 
data used by the City of New York and by 
grassroots first responders;
•	 Review of the academic scholarship on disasters 
(reflected in the bibliography at the end of this 
report).
The report is organized as follows. First, we 
provide a vocabulary and framework through 
which to analyze the Two Sandy problem. Then, 
we look at some of the ways that multiple Sandys 
were produced in seemingly innocuous choices 
concerning how to identify vulnerable populations, 
as well as timelines for aid and recovery. We then 
move to a case study of housing and rebuilding, 
particularly on Staten Island. Finally, we end with a 
city-wide analysis of how the Two Sandy problem is 
manifesting in urban climate change politics. 
EQUITY AND 
DISCONTENT
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Interviewer: When social scientists talk about the impact of a storm like Sandy, often they talk about it in 
terms of inequality between races, classes and genders.
Interviewee: Horse shit. Never. I’ve never seen it and I’ve worked storms all over the country, nobody that 
I know of or I’ve ever been associated with thinks like that. That is people who want to start crap. I have 
never been involved where you think of poor versus rich, black versus white. I’ve been telling people for 
years storms do not differentiate between Republicans and Democrats. You respond the same way no 
matter who they are. The problem is in the poorer neighborhoods it’s a little more difficult to get back on 
your feet because they don’t have the resilience, the money in the bank, the borrowing ability to go out 
and get the money you need to rebuild your house, buy new stuff for your apartment. It’s not there.  And 
that, I think, is the fundamental issue.
- New York State emergency manager
A major tension in disaster response and recovery is that, even if everyone is treated equally during the event (which may or may not happen), the burdens of disaster are not borne evenly. In Hurricane Sandy, this unevenness reflected the city’s spatialized economic inequality. The New York City area 
is one of the most economically unequal metropolitan areas in the United States, and this income inequality 
has increased in recent years (New York City Comptroller 2012; Weinberg 2011). Moreover, urban planning 
in the post-war era relocated many of the city’s poorest residents to the coastline, the part of New York City 
hardest hit by Sandy (Mahler 2012). 
Interviews with residents heavily affected by 
the storm revealed ubiquitous concern with the 
difference in post-storm services received by rich 
versus poor. People talked about watching FEMA 
trucks drive by to wealthier neighborhoods with 
more single-family homes and fewer rentals, as 
homeowners talked about renters having an easier 
time of recovery (SRL interview). City officials 
anticipated scrutiny of their treatment of people 
of different income and race categories. Fearful of 
“another Katrina,” they sent canvassers to knock on 
the doors of what one official called “our minority 
friends” (SRL interview). As the opening quote 
above explains, disparate burdens in the wake of 
crisis are not usually intentional neglect and every 
effort is made to distribute aid equally, but uneven 
recovery persists nonetheless, often along lines of 
socioeconomic status. Thus, the root problem in 
equitable disaster recovery is not the actions and 
intentions of individual actors. Rather, the problem 
is systemic, and extreme events highlight and 
reproduce inequities that existed before the storm. 
This section starts with a definition of inequity and 
its relationship to terms used in disaster discourse 
such as vulnerability and resiliency. It then details 
the kinds of interventions that can address inequity 
and those that do not. 
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Equity versus equality
[We] said, ‘Look, we’re looking to see if we have the capacity to feed everybody, faculty and also families. 
We don’t know if we can, but it’s something we’re looking into.’ So, then this guy says, ‘I really think you 
should plan to have the Public Safety vans bring food to the people in outlying areas.’  So I said to him, 
‘Well, where do you live?’  He said, ‘I live in the Bronx.’ And I said, ‘But you had power in the Bronx. 
Why…why would we have brought you food?’ And he said, ‘Well, that’s just fair. If the people down here 
are getting food, why wouldn’t we?’
 
- High-ranking administrator at an NYC university
The concept of fairness quoted above was not 
uncommon after Hurricane Sandy, although it 
was rarely expressed in such extreme terms. Some 
city officials said that Sandy was the storm that 
equalized everybody overnight, but of course 
some areas had power and food while others did 
not. Moreover, those most affected by the storm 
were affected differently depending on pre-storm 
vulnerabilities and resilience. 
The Red Cross defines vulnerability as the 
diminished capacity of an individual or group 
to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from 
the impact of a natural or human-made hazard 
(IFRC 2013). Vulnerability is usually associated 
with poverty, “but it can also arise when people 
are isolated, insecure and defenseless in the face of 
risk, shock or stress” and so includes impoverished 
social networks as well (IFRC 2013). Resilience 
refers to the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, 
recover from, and more successfully adapt to 
adverse events (Cutter et al 2013). It also involves, 
“at a deeper level, consideration of the complexity 
and interconnectedness of systems” such as social, 
economic, and political systems (Thayer et al 
2013, p 2; also see Buckland 1999). This means 
interrogating the complex structural reasons why 
high vulnerability and low resilience cluster in 
certain geographical areas and within particular 
populations. For example, in Far Rockaway, an area 
that already had low access to healthy food before 
the storm, stores were not open and there was no 
access to cars or public transportation, the situation 
was particularly dire. One resident explained, “We 
didn’t have any power, any stores. Even if you had 
money, it was useless because you couldn’t buy 
anything. Nothing was open. So I really went two 
or three days without eating until they brought the 
Red Cross and stuff out here” (SRL interview). 
Interventions, whether via policy or immediate aid, 
must address these differences in vulnerability and 
resilience for a just recovery. That is, for equitable 
versus equal allocations of aid. Here, equality refers 
to fair exchange, where each individual or group 
receives the same quantity of goods. Equity is about 
fair or just allocation, where greater needs receive 
greater attention and resources with the goal of 
bringing everyone to similar levels of vulnerability 
and resilience. The even distribution of risk over 
groups in a population is called “dispersive equity” 
(Fishburn and Sarin 1991). For example, equal aid 
would ensure everyone gets two loaves of bread—
the foundations of the quotes that opened this 
section—while equitable aid would provide people 
with as much bread as they need. Dispersive equity 
would aim to ensure everyone has two loaves of 
bread in their cupboards before disaster hits. 
Equity in disaster is further complicated because 
immediate relief and “build it back” plans can fail 
to achieve dispersive equity by attempting to make 
things the same as they were before the storm. 
In best case scenarios, such plans reproduce the 
Two Sandys phenomenon, as people with little 
resilience are in the same vulnerable position as 
before the storm. At worst, uneven aid can put 
populations in even more vulnerable positions 
for the next disaster (see, for example, section 5 
on the case of increased debt post-Sandy). Thus, 
equitable recovery must address systemic causes of 
vulnerability and low resilience, rather than focus 
Page 8
The concept of equity directs attention to the 
specific experiences—and needs—of recovery at the 
individual and community level.
exclusively on technological fixes that put sandbars 
and new flood zones in place, but fail to address the 
social and political foundations of uneven risk. As 
will be discussed in the next section, a commitment 
to equitable aid alters both the content and the 
timeframe of disaster relief and recovery work. As 
a director of a community-based organization that 
became a relief hub after Sandy explains:
“The obvious thing to say about the storm 
in low income communities like Red Hook 
is that it was this very graphic sort of sped-
up lens into the kind of grinding need that’s 
always there, so people in Red Hook always 
need jobs. There’s always income insecuri-
ty. There’s always crappy food supply, lousy 
schools, no good public transportations dai-
ly, right? All those things got really magnified 
during the storm, and there was a lot of at-
tention on addressing them in the short-term. 
In the long-term there’s still no high school in 
the neighborhood. There’s still—people don’t 
have jobs” (SRL interview).
The Two Sandy framework clarifies these issues. 
If equality informed recovery logic of elite 
institutions after the storm, the concept of equity 
directs attention to the specific experiences—
and needs—of recovery at the individual and 
community level (Cook 1983; Culyer 2001; Pratto 
et al 1999). Interviewees and CBO public reports 
consistently point out inequity rather than equality 
as a key problem within disaster response resource 
distribution. This frame reverses some top-down 
decisions to recognize, and then dismiss, pre-
storm vulnerabilities as basis for recovery aid. For 
example, some people without housing after the 
storm who were placed in hotels had been either 
homeless or marginally housed before the storm. 
Rather that extending equitable aid to raise affected 
New Yorkers to less vulnerable positions overall, 
those with highest vulnerability due to chronic lack 
of housing were excluded from assistance altogether 
(Coalition for the Homeless 2013).
AN ANALYSIS OF AID
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If inequity in disaster response and recovery is systemic, rather than the result of deliberate individual or group action, then how does it come about? This section looks at a selection of seemingly benign but high-impact ways that top-down responses to the storm by elite institutions produced or reproduced 
uneven vulnerability and low resilience. 
Stakeholders versus vulnerable populations 
About FEMA, I can tell you they came a few times. As a result of the hurricane we had cracks in the 
walls. FEMA didn’t pay too much attention to that, they said it’s personal, but it’s Projects here so they 
[management of building] need to take care of it and FEMA isn’t responsible. And we were registered. In 
general, let me tell you that when our houses were in management independently everything would be 
fixed instantly.
- Coney Island resident
One of the major dilemmas facing disaster aid is 
the mismatch between inherited everyday social 
and spatial categories, such as “homeowner” and 
“renter” or “Brooklyn” and “New Jersey,” and how 
disasters consistently cross and defy those systems 
of organization. Institutions whose daily activities 
do not include emergency response—from federal 
and state governments to educational centers 
to community-based organizations—have an 
overwhelming incentive to take the categories and 
jurisdictions they use in their everyday activities 
and apply them to disaster relief. Hurricane 
Sandy was no exception. The problem is that this 
approach unjustifiably privileged some groups over 
others. In some cases, the decision was deliberate. 
For example, the first iteration of New Jersey’s 
state action plan directed far more aid resources 
at homeowners than renters, when both were, 
and continue to be, homeless (Fair Share Housing 
Center 2013; Coalition for the Homeless 2013). 
In other cases, pre-existing categorizations meant 
that vulnerable populations were overlooked. 
Photo “Occupy Sandy” by Victoria Walker licensed under CC BY-ND 2.0 
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For example, when an NYC university organized 
emergency aid for its resident population, it focused 
on undergraduate students on campus, but not 
those in campus faculty housing whose residents 
included small children, the elderly, and people 
with disabilities. Using categories or jurisdictional 
boundaries created for non-crisis routines is 
efficient, but can exacerbate, or even create, 
disparity. 
Definitions of crisis and effects on aid 
This is three freaking months, if you haven’t found a place to be warm in three freaking months you don’t 
need the city’s help; you’ve already figured it out. […] At some point the responsibility of government has 
to stop somewhere and you as Joe Blow citizen need to figure out how to do your own thing.   
- NYC government official
I mean recovery is a loaded word when you’re talking about places that have been screwed over before 
the storm like Coney Island. There’s not going to be a point where you come up and say ‘all right, now the 
recovery is finished and it’s good.’  You’ve got 60,000 people living in high-rise housing projects without 
adequate services whether it is health care services or [building] sanitation services.
- Volunteer first responder
Different first response groups in NYC identified 
the main crises caused by Hurricane Sandy 
differently. Consistently, government officials 
made clear demarcations between storm effects 
and other, more systemic problems, focusing on 
evacuation successes and failures, immediate 
and short term sheltering logistics, fuel and 
transportation problems, changes in access to 
healthcare following the closure or evacuation of 
hospitals, and barriers to rebuilding (City of New 
York 2013b). In the city’s After Action Report, for 
example, the identified areas of concern are all 
issues which started a few days before the storm, 
and can be addressed by technical fixes in the near 
future. And while city and state governments have 
devoted a substantial amount of planning efforts to 
long-term reconstruction after Sandy, the bulk of 
these efforts have focused on protecting rather than 
changing the social status quo. The NYC Special 
Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR), for 
example, proposes new developments in Manhattan 
to address the “shortage” of office space (City of 
New York 2013a).
However, advocate, grassroots, and community-
based groups consistently saw Hurricane Sandy and 
its effects as a punctuation mark in a much longer, 
chronic crisis of wealth inequity and unequal access 
to resources. Income insecurity, a lack of access 
to education, unaffordable housing stock, and 
widespread debt -- the long-term trauma of poverty 
and insecurity -- are disasters in and of themselves 
(Erikson 1995).  For many communities, “back to 
normal” does not mean recovery, but a return to 
Different first response groups identified the main 
crises caused by Hurricane Sandy differently. 
Government officials made clear demarcations 
between storm effects and other systemic problems, 
while groups on the ground saw the storm as a 
punctuation mark in a much longer crisis.
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poverty and vulnerability. Thus, grassroots groups 
such as Alliance for a Just Rebuilding, a coalition 
of faith groups, labor unions, community groups, 
and policy and environmental organizations, frame 
recovery in terms of good jobs, affordable housing, 
renewable energy, accessible health care, and 
community consultation for recovery plans rather 
than returning New York City’s status quo (Alliance 
for a Just Rebuilding 2013). 
The differences between the two genres of 
recovery concerns not only the type of aid, but 
also its timeframe. Government programs are 
characterized by deadlines for aid applications, 
implying that the crises began all at once on 
October 29, 2012, and that certain needs will end 
by the deadline. While some city and state recovery 
plans address what they see as long term problems 
in New York City, such as a lack of office stock, 
these are not framed as Sandy-related problems, 
but a sort of recovery “bonus,” and the underlying 
premise of elite responses is that New Yorkers are 
moving through the crisis at a similar rate. Yet, 
even for something as material as housing repairs, 
some people fled New York City after the storm and 
throughout the winter, and returned to flooded, 
mold-infested buildings six months later during 
the summer. If deadlines are needed for program 
efficiency, rolling deadlines or open enrollment 
would be more appropriate for these realities. Some 
grassroots and community-based organizations, 
such as Occupy Sandy, see the recovery in terms 
of years and even generations to address systemic 
issues such as wealth inequity. This definition of 
recovery also extends the geographical area of a 
chronic disaster beyond hard hit areas into parts of 
New York City that remained dry during the storm, 
but that can be classified as vulnerable populations 
in an ongoing crisis. 
This is not to say that government and other elite 
methods of organizing aid during Sandy were 
wantonly neglectful. Indeed, the trends outlined 
here are common across many disasters in various 
countries (Solnit 2010; Knowles 2012). This tale of 
two Sandys and the resulting dual genres of disaster 
aid are premised on long term, systemic inequities 
produced and reproduced by economic, social, 
cultural, and historical forces. Many government 
actors are aware of the systemic roots of the Two 
Sandys problem, both within and outside of 
disaster scenarios (Lu 2010). New York City can 
be a more sustainable city, and even a leader in the 
field, by rebuilding infrastructure, programs, and 
funding in ways that achieve dispersive equity by 
addressing uneven burdens of social, economic, 
and environmental harm for all neighborhoods and 
populations.
Photo “Sailors assist with Hurricane Sandy clean-up.” by Official U.S. Navy Imagery licensed under CC BY 2.0
HOUSING: REBUILD, 
UNBUILD, OR BUILD 
BETTER?
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Housing is a complex case of the Two Sandy problem because of the way the issue manifests in an ongoing debate—particularly on Staten Island—over whether rebuilding is the best strategy to meet people’s present and future needs. There has been some success in overcoming the Two Sandy divide, 
but also lingering failure. 
Rezoning and recovery
Some argue for redeveloping damaged structures 
in a more storm-resilient way, while others would 
prefer to limit rebuilding and development in 
flood-prone areas. State officials—at the urging of a 
number of residents—have been making the latter 
case, and the City of New York the former.  As the 
state and the city negotiate over which areas should 
be eligible for redevelopment and which should 
return to open space, many residents remain in 
limbo, caught between clashing government visions 
of recovery.
The neighborhood of Oakwood Beach on Staten 
Island is a rare example of community members 
and government working together fruitfully. A 
group of nearly two hundred homeowners met 
shortly after Sandy and collectively decided they 
wanted to move rather than rebuild. Together, 
they successfully lobbied for a government buyout 
of the neighborhood. Governor Cuomo declared 
their homes part of an “enhanced area” that the 
state would convert to a public park or wetlands to 
protect from future flooding and storm surge. 
Soon after Governor Cuomo announced in January 
that he intended to buy out damaged houses 
(Kaplan 2013), hundreds of other homeowners 
along the South and East Shores of Staten Island 
formed groups to press for buyouts in their own 
areas. Yet, such aid is far less certain for these new 
groups in nearly every other devastated shorefront 
community on Staten Island: the buyouts have 
Thank God they finally stopped running those commercials because I wanted to shoot the TV. ‘Repair. 
Repair, rebuild, get home.’ And so this is what people were doing. This is why they maxed out their saving 
accounts, their credit cards, their 401K. Everything that they could possibly pull from to get themselves 
back in their homes.
- Staten Island resident
The housing situation has been compounded. We have a housing problem period, in New York City, but 
now it’s really compounded by homeless people. Now we have homeless people as a result of Sandy and 
we have a continuing shrinking affordable housing market. That’s a disaster if I’ve ever known one. The 
next Mayor is going to have to address housing. And with a particular view of preventing climate change 
impact on that housing. So if they build exactly where they were before, that’s pretty much Einstein’s defi-
nition of insanity. 
- Executive Director, environmental justice organization
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recently been extended to Ocean Breeze (State of 
New York 2013), but New Dorp Beach, Midland 
Beach, and Crescent Beach, among others, have not 
yet been taken up on their petitions for buyouts. In 
these cases, it has proven difficult for community 
groups and government to transcend the Two 
Sandy divide.
These areas may only be eligible for New York 
City’s alternative to the state buyouts, a plan that 
would enable, rather than prohibit, redevelopment. 
“The city is vehement about wanting to redevelop 
the waterfront,” a state official explained in an 
SRL interview. To accommodate this drive for 
development, the City’s Build it Back program 
offers individual residents, as opposed to 
neighborhoods, an “acquisition for redevelopment” 
rather than a buyout. It remains unclear who will 
be eligible for this assistance. At the time of writing, 
only one home has been bought through the City 
program. Some who initially wanted to relocate 
have been unable to wait any longer for a place 
to live under either program, and have rebuilt or 
are returning to live in houses that are moldy or 
structurally damaged. 
A legacy of challenges
Staten Island’s confused, contradictory housing 
recovery process is only one way that the 
mishandling of post-disaster housing is creating 
an entirely new crisis for many New York City 
residents—including renters, NYCHA tenants, 
and immigrants, in addition to homeowners. A 
report by Strike Debt (2012) shortly after Sandy 
found that most aid to individuals occurred in 
the form of loans, and thus will “ultimately make 
long-term financial burden the precondition for 
‘recovery.’” Many homeowners SRL interviewed, 
some of whom were already “under water” on 
their mortgages, have incurred substantial debt 
to rebuild their homes. Others have gone into 
foreclosure, unable to afford mortgage payments in 
addition to paying rent for temporary housing. This 
temporary housing was required because the city 
declined FEMA trailers to house displaced people, 
and municipal programs housing displaced people 
in hotels recently ended.
Residents who chose to rebuild in flood-vulnerable 
areas face expensive elevation requirements and 
sharply increased insurance rates, particularly as 
national flood insurance subsidies are phased out 
under the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform 
Act of 2012. Costs remain uncertain, since the 
FEMA flood maps that determine insurance rates 
and rebuilding requirements are being revised, and 
final maps are not expected for at least another year 
at the time of this writing. 
For renters, and those displaced from their homes, 
there is an acute lack of affordable housing. A 
survey of renters on Staten Island by Make the Road 
New York finds that rents have increased and that 
overcrowded apartments are more common since 
Sandy (report is forthcoming 2014). More residents 
are now living with mold that will produce long 
term health effects. Thus, conflicting policies and 
timelines, alongside a lack of communication, 
continues to contribute to delays and confusion. 
Housing recovery is now compounded by a 
“second Sandy” in the form of a financial crisis 
centered on debt-based aid, foreclosures, and steep 
insurance and rebuilding costs, as well as the health 
effects of living in substandard housing. For these 
populations, the effects of Sandy are as acute now 
as they were a year ago. Even if many homeowners 
possessed higher resilience in the immediate 
aftermath of Sandy, they are now in a significantly 
more vulnerable position for the next extreme 
weather event. All of our interviewees, regardless of 
their position, agreed that there will be a next time. 
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CLIMATE CHANGE: 
MITIGATION TO 
ADAPTATION
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After Sandy, high profile figures in the public sphere suggested the storm would transform climate politics (Hansen 2012; Barrett 2012; Borenstein 2012). Yet, our interviews found that for the most part, people who were already concerned about climate change continued to be so, and those who 
were not, continued not to be even if they were persuaded that climate change played a role in the storm. 
Careful attention to the problem was largely restricted to government actors and other policy experts, with 
some exceptions among community groups and individuals that do not possess the same resources to make 
large scale changes to climate politics compared to municipal government and its allies. Global warming 
remains a looming threat to the city. 
A failure to address greenhouse gas 
emissions
The Two Sandys phenomenon in climate politics 
is fostered by city government setting the agenda 
for the city’s climate politics while failing to engage 
the broader population in the problem. After 
Sandy, this meant that the city’s shift in emphasis to 
adaptation (efforts to limit NYC’s vulnerability to 
climate change impacts) sidelined the fundamental 
need for the city to show leadership with regard 
to mitigation (reducing the magnitude of climate 
change itself ). The mayor and city council still 
have a responsibility to reduce emissions of the 
greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change, 
but so far their actions have fallen far short of what 
was promised even in the city’s own climate change 
plans (City of New York 2007).
 
In May 2007, Mayor Michael Bloomberg released 
an ambitious, multi-decade plan for the city 
called “PlaNYC 2030”. The plan’s top priorities 
were to help prevent or lessen the effects of global 
climate change by cutting the city’s greenhouse 
gas emissions (mitigation), and, to a lesser extent, 
making changes in systems and infrastructure 
in anticipation of global warming’s effects 
(adaptation). No community group representative 
sat on either of the two climate-oriented panels that 
Bloomberg established, and environmental justice 
groups were hardly consulted during the important 
phases of drafting the plan (City of New York 2008; 
Rosan 2011). In the years after PlaNYC’s release, 
the sustainability initiatives that gained the most 
attention—such as bike lanes, park improvements, 
and tree-planting—were debated with little 
reference to climate. Climate change as such began 
to fade from the public discourse, even as policy 
experts within government and in some institutes 
and NGOs stayed focused on the problem. 
After Hurricane Sandy, most interviewees from 
policy-oriented sectors said that the storm had 
changed the conversation, putting climate change 
at the top of the public agenda. But we found little 
evidence of this, especially with respect to taking 
action to reduce New York’s contribution to the 
global problem. The city’s own Special Initiative 
for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR) report 
Climate change is now in the city’s DNA.
- City government disaster relief officer
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generally ignores the need to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions (City of New York 2013a), even 
though SRL interviews with climate change experts 
demonstrate that mitigation and adaptation 
complement and enhance one another. Moreover, 
the two principal community-rooted responses to 
SIRR—one from the Alliance for a Just Rebuilding, 
and the other from the Sandy Regional Assembly—
prioritized doing more for lower-income and non-
white New Yorkers in the rebuilding process even 
when they also devoted space to reducing emissions 
(Alliance for a Just Rebuilding 2013; Sandy 
Regional Assembly 2012). A union representative 
reported in an interview that although change was 
on the minds of their organization’s members, jobs 
and healthcare would remain their top priorities. 
Technically, mitigation remains on the agenda, but 
it has drifted dangerously far from the spotlight.
Serious mitigation measures may pose a threat to 
powerful interests. Social scientists have found 
that when it comes to responsibility for emissions 
generated indirectly by consumption, emissions 
correlate closely to wealth (Chakravarty et al 2009). 
Counting emissions associated with airports also 
makes a big difference–especially in cities with 
large tourism industries. Putting a city like New 
York in global perspective, the shift away from 
exploring ways of reducing the emissions for which 
NYC is responsible and towards safeguarding 
residents from flooding, looks like an abdication 
of responsibility to the wider world. The city’s 
emissions will continue to harm people in places 
like the Philippines and Bangladesh, even if efforts 
are made to protect the health and safety of local 
residents.
Many groups, like New York’s Urban Green 
Council, have advocated for combining adaptation 
and mitigation (Urban Green Council 2013a). 
Urban Green has also highlighted how New York 
University’s co-generation plant not only evinced 
resilience during the storm—the power stayed on 
in a number of key buildings when the main grid 
shut down—it also significantly cut the university’s 
carbon emissions by recycling energy (Urban Green 
Council 2013b). Broader social policy can also 
address mitigation in surprising ways. Policies like 
Mayor-elect Bill de Blasio’s proposed tax on New 
Yorkers earning half a million dollars or more could 
reduce what climate justice scholars call “luxury 
emissions” (Agarwal and Narain 1991) by reducing 
the consumption of the very wealthy. 
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Solutions from the grassroots
Transcending the Two Sandy problem could also 
mean combining the resources of government 
and elite groups with the creativity and energy 
of people and groups presently outside those 
circles. New Yorkers affected by Sandy, community 
groups, and some NGOs have understandably been 
preoccupied with engaging government agendas for 
rebuilding-- agendas with an almost exclusive focus 
on adaptation. This puts them in a reactive position. 
Nevertheless, some grassroots groups have seized the 
opportunity to engage creatively in a broader set of 
climate politics. 
 
For example, Uprose, an environmental justice 
organization in Sunset Park, hosted a climate 
justice youth summit for young people of color 
in July, seeking to funnel discontent with extreme 
weather’s impact into a broader campaign on 
climate. Elizabeth Yeampierre, Uprose’s executive 
director, said that poor people of color were 
disproportionately affected by the direct and indirect 
impacts of Sandy and need to take leadership, not 
just in building a community-wide movement, but 
also in pushing the US climate movement in general 
to be more diverse (SRL interview). 
Another example is El Puente, an environmental 
justice organization based in Williamsburg that 
helped organize an Encuentro in Puerto Rico in 
the Spring of 2013 to take advantage of Puerto 
Rico’s diaspora to apply long-term political pressure 
on politicians to take stronger action on curbing 
emissions. The focus was on organizing in Chicago, 
New York, and Miami, where the Puerto Rican 
community has leverage with the Democratic Party. 
A third example has been the widespread work 
within Occupy Sandy to create a grassroots 
movement to address climate change in terms of 
wealth disparity and the fossil fuel industry, most 
concretely with the Wildfire initiative (a long-term 
community-based social justice organization)which 
was founded in Far Rockaway). 
These small groups confront challenges in engaging 
with the large-scale politics of preventing the worst 
impacts of climate change. But leadership from 
below is as important as leadership from above. 
Indeed, it will prove crucial to forcing governments, 
corporations, and large civil society groups to take 
urgent measures to help prevent climate change. 
The Two Sandys phenomenon in climate politics is 
fostered by city government setting the agenda for 
the city’s climate politics while failing to engage the 
broader population in the problem.
Photo “Breezy Point, NY - After Hurricane Sandy” by  Christopher D. Sondi licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
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This white paper has illustrated some of the diverse ways that two competing logics of recovery—the Two Sandys phenomenon—have shaped the Hurricane’s aftermath in New York City. The Two Sandys problem is systemic. It does not follow from individual choices and intentions, but rather from large-
scale, deeply entrenched social structures. This means that while short-term responses to the disaster are vital 
to alleviate immediate suffering, true solutions to the Two Sandys problem must be systemic solutions. This 
requires shifting the discussion away from arguments that “the government messed up,” towards the reasons 
elite aid across disasters and throughout the last several decades tends to respond in ways that often do not 
line up with the needs of people on the ground. 
Thus, this white paper moves away from the countless conceivable technical fixes for disaster towards 
something that has received much less attention: the cultural tendencies to understand disaster in two 
fundamentally different ways. If we make progress on this cultural macro-level, the technical specifics will 
follow. Uneven vulnerability and a lack of distributive equity is the prime issue for disaster planning and 
response to address. Addressing unequal access to education becomes an appropriate disaster plan. Building 
and maintaining access to affordable housing becomes a disaster plan. 
This paper has also sought to demonstrate that the less visible Sandy manifested in all manner of grassroots 
leadership and organizing—a chaotic but energetic series of responses. This warrants more attention. 
Grassroots and community organizing is not just an expression of frustration and suffering, but also a 
source of hope for a more equitable recovery and more widespread resiliency. This will mean addressing the 
structural roots of inequality that Superstorm Sandy helped lay bare, and which elements of the recovery 
helped reproduce them. Our hope is that telling A Tale of Two Sandys can all help all New Yorkers better 
understand their situation and clarify their options. 
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